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Joining the Crowd: 
The Impact of Social Information in Crowdfunding 
Campaigns 
Claire van Teunenbroeka*, René Bekkersa 
aVU University, Center for Philanthropic Studies, de Boelelaan 1081, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
 
1. Abstract  
Philanthropic crowdfunding is an online funding method with a growing popularity. In this study we quantify 
the effects of information about the donation behavior of previous donors, also known as social information. 
We report results from a large natural field experiment among visitors (n = 23,676) of a crowdfunding 
platform advertising campaigns for artists and nonprofit organizations in the field of arts and culture. 
Visitors who were exposed to a reminder about the average donation amount of previous donors were not 
more likely to donate than visitors who were not exposed to this information. Neither did visitors who 
decided to donate give higher amounts.  
2. Introduction 
As charitable giving increasingly takes place online, using fundraising instruments like philanthropic 
crowdfunding, the online context is an increasingly important research setting. Philanthropic 
crowdfunding (i.e. donation and reward-based crowdfunding) is a relatively new online fundraising 
instrument where one can fund their project via an open call, and tap a large crowd of mainly 
unknown individuals for small sums of money without providing a financial return (van 
Teunenbroek & Borst, 2015). Even though, philanthropic crowdfunding is a popular funding 
method, it is less effective in assembling money than other forms of crowdfunding (van 
Teunenbroek & Borst, 2015) and could favor from a stimulus to increase the individual donations. 
However, philanthropic crowdfunding has received less attention from researchers than for 
example commercial crowdfunding and as a result we know less about possible stimulants for 
increasing the success rate (i.e. reaching the target amount). Thus, a study of the influence on the 
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success of online fundraising campaigns, like crowdfunding, is timely.  
As a result of the absence of a financial compensation, prosocial behavior is expected to be 
a dominant incentive and influence in philanthropic crowdfunding, since philanthropic behavior is 
highly influenced by social influences (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). In this paper we aim to test the 
effect of one specifically social stimulant: information about the donation behavior of previous 
donors, also known as social information (Shang & Croson, 2009). We specifically focus on the 
donation amount of previous donors. This study of social information as a charitable stimulant will 
help us further understand the social process behind online philanthropic behaviour, like 
crowdfunding. At the same time, the study will provide knowledge that can increases the success 
rate of philanthropic crowdfunding projects.   
Previous research in offline contexts with mainly personal contact between the initiator 
(i.e. solicitor) and donor, such as telethons and face-to-face fundraising campaigns, provided 
evidence for the assumption that social information could ‘nudge’ individuals into donating higher 
amounts (e.g. Agerström, Carlsson, Nicklasson, & Guntell, 2016; Alpizar, Carlsson, & Johansson-
Stenman, 2008a, 2008b; Klinowski, 2015; Martin & Randal, 2008; Shang, Croson, & Reed, 2012; 
Shang & Croson, 2009; Smith, Windmeijer, & Wright, 2014). Acknowledging the difference between 
the offline and online context we aim to test the effect of social information in relation to the 
success of philanthropic crowdfunding. By researching the following research question we present 
the kind of data needed to resolve it. How will social information in the form of earlier donation 
amounts influence donation behaviour in a crowdfunding context?   
Some of the positive findings of the effect of social information on the amount donated as 
reported in empirical studies discussed above and in more detail later in this paper are quite strong 
(Bekkers, 2012). However, previous research also demonstrates that the effect works both ways in 
an asymmetrical order: negative social information is two times stronger than positive social 
information (Croson & Shang, 2008). Social information is considered as negative, if it is lower than 
an individuals intended donation amount. Both from a scientific perspective and practical point of 
view it is important to know whether social information has a generic effect, regardless of an 
individuals intended donation amount.    
This study has essentially two goals. First to further understand the social process behind 
online philanthropic behaviour, like crowdfunding. Second, the study will provide knowledge that 
can increases the success rate of philanthropic crowdfunding projects. We conducted a field 
experiment with actual donors at a Dutch philanthropic crowdfunding platform, specialized in 
cultural art projects. This study is a follow-up study building upon the design of van Teunenbroek 
(2016): providing donors with the true average donation amount of previous donors to increase the 
amount donated.   
Our methodological approach provides us with several advantages over this earlier study. 
First, our study uses a real crowdfunding context instead of an artificial one. Second, our subject 
pool consists out of actual donors instead of a students in a convenience sample. Third, we use 
actual house money instead of seed money. Also, we test the effect of social information over the 
complete life course of a large number of campaigns. Earlier research (van Teunenbroek, 2016) 
used a class-room experiment which did not allow for an investigation of changes in the effects of 






the literature on philanthropic participation in online platforms. We create a natural field 
experiment using a preregistered random control trial. Previous research has relied primarily on 
system data on donations via platforms that did not manipulate social incentives (Bøg, Harmgart, 
Huck, & Jeffers, 2012; Sasaki, 2015; Smith et al., 2014).    
Our paper also contributes to the growing but still limited literature on crowdfunding. 
Finally, our study provides practical implications for initiators in improving their platform design.  
    
3. Theory and hypotheses 
There is overwhelming evidence for the importance of the influence of social norms on donation 
behaviour: donating is a form of social behaviour encouraged by social norms and social incentives 
(Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). The research shows that donors adjust their charitable behaviour 
according to social information. Specifically, studies show that when individuals are presented with 
information on the donation amount of previous donors their donation amount increases (e.g. 
Alpizar et al., 2008a; Bekkers, 2012; Martin & Randal, 2008; Shang et al., 2012; van Teunenbroek, 
2016). For example, in a field experiment with donations to an art gallery, Martin and Randal (2008) 
demonstrate that visitors prefer to donate amounts similar to the coins and bills in a transparent 
box at the entrance. Also, the researchers found that a few large denomination bills ($50) resulted 
in higher donations per donor ($2.39) than displaying large amounts of ($.50) coins ($1.69).  
In a field experiment with donors to a public radio campaign, Croson and Shang (2013) and 
Shang and Croson (2009), found that the donations are higher after potential donors are informed 
about the donation amount of previous donors. Shang and Croson (2009) demonstrate that 
individuals adjust their donation according to the reference amount, on average with $13 (12%). 
The researchers also found that renewing donors are unaffected by social information (Murphy, 
Batmunkh, Nilsson, & Ray, 2015; Shang & Croson, 2009). In their follow up study with a similar 
design, Croson et al. (2013) demonstrate that if the reference amount is too high ($1000, based on 
the 99
th
 percentile), it ceases to have an effect. While a large amount such as $600 (based on the 
95
th
 percentile) increases the donations with about $51 (14%).   
In their field experiment with tourists at a national park, Alpizar et al. (2008a), solicitors 
verbally informed potential donors about the ‘typical’ donation amount ($10) of previous donors, 
which increased donations with about 50 cents (18%).   
Bekkers (2012) sent alumni a letter from the University Foundation asking for a donation, 
also informing them that an amount of €35 would be most helpful. Therefore framing the informing 
as a suggestion amount, finding that it increased the donations by €3.40 (12%). Even though, the 
faming does not specially refer to the donation behaviour of previous donors, it gives a clear idea of 
the social norm as with social information.   
In a class-room experiment mimicking a crowdfunding environment using a real 
crowdfunding project, van Teunenbroek (2016) found that displaying the average (€15) donation 
amount of previous donors resulted in students indicating that they would donate amounts even 
higher than the displayed amount: the most popular contribution was €10 in the control and €20 in 






Even though, the students only indicated the donation amount and never made an actual donation, 
the context was semi-hypothetical, since the students were informed that at least 10% of the 
indicated donations would actually be donated to the project.  
Concluding, the positive effect is rather large ranging around 10% (Bekkers, 2012; Croson & 
Shang, 2008; Martin & Randal, 2008; Shang et al., 2012; Shang & Croson, 2004; van Teunenbroek, 
2016), 15% (Cialdini & Schroeder, 1976; Croson & Shang, 2013; Smith, Windmeijer, & Wright, 2012) 
and 20% (Agerström et al., 2016; Alpizar et al., 2008a). Not only lab experiments confirm this 
positive relation, but also field experiments show similar results. Accordingly, we propose that:  
 H1: Social information increases the amount donated.    
  
3.1 Social norm and reactance  
Even though a fast amount of studies demonstrate that providing social information is an effective 
method to increase individual donations, previous research also found that the effect works both 
ways: if social information is negative, the amount donated decreases; if it is positive, the amount 
increases (Croson & Shang, 2008; Martin & Randal, 2008). Social information is labelled as negative 
if it is lower than an individuals intended donation amount, also described as downward social 
information (Croson & Shang, 2008). The effect seems to be asymmetric: negative social 
information has a stronger influence (26% decrease) than positive social information (10% increase) 
(Croson & Shang, 2008).   
We examine how the social information effect varies with the concurrent average donation 
amount, using two hypotheses: social norm and reactance hypothesis. The social norm hypothesis 
predicts that if the amount displayed in the social information condition is larger than the intended 
donation amount, the amount donated increases, and when the amount displayed is lower the 
amount donated decreases. A lower amount signals that the norm is to make a small donation 
which is in accordance with an individual’s self-interest in terms of money: the individual can 
donate a lower amount (i.e. save money) and still follow social norms. Accordingly, we propose 
that:  
H2: Social information increases the amount donated when the suggestion amount is larger 
than the intended donation amount.  
While the social norm hypothesis refers to the trend of the effect (i.e. positive or negative), the 
reactance hypothesis refers to the strength of the effect (i.e. weak or strong). Our reactance 
hypothesis predicts that the larger the difference between the amount displayed and the amount 
donors intended to give, the smaller the effect of the amount displayed. In other words, it refers to 
the gap between the intended donation amount and suggestion amount in relation to the strength 
of social information. We argue that the gap is important since an individual who perceives the high 
amount as obnoxious, will react by adopting or strengthening an opposing view or attitude, as a 
result of feeling as if their perceived behavioural freedom was removed.   
Social scientists describe this phenomenon in their reactance theory, which has been 
broadly studied in social marketing. For example, potential buyers develop a negative view and 






advertisements (Koslow, 2000). More specific, the effect has also been found in connecting with 
social information. For example, Shang and Croson (2013) found that if the presented amount is too 
high (e.g. based on the 99
th
 percentile), is ceases to increase the amount donated. In other words, 
presenting the donation behaviour of previous donors could lead to a boomerang effect if the 
suggestion amount lays too far from the intended donation amount. Accordingly, we propose that:   
H3: The social information effect is stronger if the difference between the suggestion 
amount and intended amount is small.   
  
3.2 Project funding period   
A crowdfunding campaign runs for a before defined number of days, on average ranging from 30 to 
60 days, during which the target amount has to be assembled to be considered successful. The 
crowdfunding literature describes that the distribution of the number of donors follows a so called 
‘bathtub shape’ (Kuppuswamy & Bayus, 2015). In other words, there seems to be a ‘funders gap’, in 
the middle of the campaign where relatively few individuals make a donation. We divide a 
crowdfunding campaign in three project funding stages, as can be seen in the figure below, since 
we argue that the effectiveness of social information depends on the project funding stage.  
The first stage (detonated by the letter ‘A’)  represents the beginning of the campaign. In 
this stage we expect a limited effect of social information, since the beginning of the campaign 
mainly consists out of strong ties (i.e. family and friends) (Agrawal, Catalini, & Goldfarb, 2011; de 
Witt, 2012; Steinberg, 2012). The second stage (detonated by the letter ‘B’) represents the middle 
of the campaign, where we expect social information to be most effective since the donor type 
strong ties has been exhausted. As a result, the type of donors change in accordance, existing out of 
donors with weak or latent ties (Borst, Moser, & Ferguson, 2016; de Witt, 2012; Steinberg, 2012). 
The difference in ties strength is mainly determined by the level of contact between the initiator 
and donor. Strong ties are those with a tight relationship and regular contact with the initiator 
(Haythornthwaite, 2005). Weak ties are casual contacts or acquaintances of the initiator 
(Haythornthwaite, 2005), while latent ties are individuals who have the possibility but have not yet 
contacted the initiator (Ellison, Steinfield, & Lampe, 2007; Haythornthwaite, 2002).  
We argue that the difference in ties strength is important for the effectiveness of social 
information, since strong ties are likely less affected by social information, because they are well 
known with the group norm trough previous interactions and could easily contact the initiator if 
needed (i.e. low threshold for personal contact). Therefore, strong ties are probably not looking for 
cues about the behaviour of others. On the other hand, the weak and latent ties have had no 
(recent) contact and therefore less information about the group norm. The lacking information 
about the group norm, i.e. ‘what is an acceptable donation amount’, stimulates individuals to 
search for cues about the behaviour of others as a reference and confirmation (Cialdini, 2007).   
The third stage (detonated by the letter ‘C’) represents the end of the campaign, where all 
three type of donors are likely to make donations. However, the weak and latent ties are now 
mainly motivated by rewards (Ryu, Kim, & Kim, 2016), these donors participate for a certain perk. 






crowdfunding provides donation categories. In accordance, we propose the following:  
H4: Social information mainly increases the amount donated in the middle of the campaign. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic presentation of the funders gap. The letters denote the three project funding period stages. The letter ‘A’ 
represents the beginning of the campaign, we argue that this part of the campaign is mostly backed by strong ties. ‘B’ represents the 
middle of the campaign, where we expect social information to be most effective since the donor type strong ties has been exhausted. 
‘C’ represents the end of the campaign, where all three type of donors are likely to make donations. However, the weak and latent ties 
are now mainly motivated by rewards.  
  
 
3.3 Project and individual influences   
The nature of our design ensures that there are several influences we cannot control for. One of 
these influences is the project funding period as explained above. Other influences are the different 
levels of a crowdfunding campaign: (1) platform, (2) project and (3) individual. As can be seen in 
figure 2, the highest level, i.e. platform level, is unaffected by the project funding period. In other 
word, platform characteristics are constant and the same for all individuals.   
 
Figure 2. A schematic representation of the different levels in our design and the project funding period. The dotted line 
denotes the influence of the project funding period. The ‘platform’ level lies above the dotted line and is therefore 
unaffected by the project funding period. In other words, the platform level is constant and the same for all individuals 







 On the other hand, not all projects are the same. For example, they can differ in their 
target amount, theme and aim. In addition, the previous literature points towards a heterogeneous 
treatment effect: there seems to be a variability in how individuals respond to social information. 
This raises the question of possible moderators, since the social information effect appears to be 
more complex and subject to contextual and individual influences. Therefore, when individual 
donor data become available, previous donation behaviour and amounts will be examined in 
exploratory analyses as potential moderators of the social information effect. In addition, we 
explore if several project characteristics influence the effectiveness of social information.  
 
3.4 Study context  
The study context consists out of a Dutch philanthropic crowdfunding platform with a sole focus on 
cultural art projects, for example: dance, photography, music, theatre, movies and visual arts. In 
2015 the platform hosted 712 projects with a success rate of 81%  and a total donation amount of 
€3.558.549 (Voordekunst, 2016a). The donations were made by 40.107 donors (Voordekunst, 
2016b) and about 13% of all the donors were renewing donors (Voordekunst, 2016a).  
The platform uses a reward and donation based model. The rewards range from a mere thank 
you message to a tour through the museum at night. Both professional and amateur artist can start 
a crowdfunding campaign, and both companies and individuals can make donations. However, we 
exclude donations from companies during our analysis, since we research individual donation 
behaviour. The minimum donation amount is €10.  
On the platform, an individual can read about the project or watch a short video where the 
initiators introduce themselves and the project. It also shows the reward scheme: i.e. the needed 
donation amount per reward. Also, the target amount, days to go before the campaign is closed, 
number of donors, percentage assembled thus far. Visitors can monitor the progress on the 
platform and both Voordekunst (i.e. platform owners) and initiators promote the project and 
provide updates using social media.   
Donors can decide to publish their (nick)names, 30-40% donate anonymous (Borst et al., 2016), 
however the donation amount itself is not published. This is a key difference with Kickstarter, an 
often cited platform from the USA, since Kickstarter does publishes the previous donation amounts. 
Another key difference is that Voordekunst is mainly funded by Dutch donors, while Kickstarter has 
a more diverse crowd in terms of geography. While most of the studies with social information thus 
far have been conducted with American donors, the current experiment build upon a Dutch 
crowdfunding platform with mainly Dutch donors. In addition, Voordekunst focusses on a relatively 
limited category of projects, cultural art projects, while Kickstarter hosts projects from a large range 
of categories.    
On average an initiator has 1 month to assemble the money. The platform uses a 80% rule in 
combination with an all-or-nothing funding model, meaning that the initiator only receives the 
money if they assembled at least 80% of their initial target amount. Otherwise, all donations are 
refunded. Therefore, a project is termed successful if at least 80% of the target amount is 
assembled in time.  






start of our experiment the platform hosted 2661 projects.  
4. Methods 
4.1 Design  
This study is a follow up study with a similar design (see van Teunenbroek, 2016) and was 
preregistered at Aspredicted.org on September 14, 2016 (see appendix C and 
https://aspredicted.org/u5w9u.pdf). The field experiment included two conditions. In the 
‘reference’ condition, a reference amount was suggested to provide donors with a social norm.  In 
this condition, participants can read that “Did you know that on average donors on Voordekunst 
donate 82 euros?”. The reference amount is the actual average of all individual donations on the 
platform (i.e. excluding donations from companies) of the last six months of the previous year. In 
the ‘base’ condition, no reference was suggested.   
The experiment was only conducted on a desktop, ignoring other instruments like mobile 
phones. We choose this design, since previous data demonstrates that most of the donors at the 
platform donate using a desktop (%). In addition, donors were randomly distributed over the two 
conditions using internet cookies. Meaning that as long as the participant used the same computer 
they would end up in the same condition. This is also the reason for excluding all non-desktop 
users, since a donor could end up in a different condition if they would for example view the project 
on their phone and donate using their computer.  
As can be seen in figure 3, the platform provides several forms of information. Most of the project 
information is presented at a central place on the website: like, the target amount, days to go, 
number of donors (i.e. social information) and percentage funded thus far (number 1). Number two 
represents the added information in the form of a reference amount which is only shown in the 
‘reference’ condition. The platform also publishes the reward scheme (i.e. which donation amount 
is needed to receive a certain reward) and the number of donors choosing this reward (number 3). 
Thus, another form of social information. The platform also published a ‘tip reward’: each initiator 
can choose a reward they prefer to publish above all other rewards (number 4).  
 
4.2 Procedure  
The moment a participant enters the website, he or she is divided into one of the two conditions 
based on internet cookies. Meaning that they are in the same condition even if they visit multiple 
projects or revisit the platform another day. If a participant decides to make a donation, they can 
travel from the ‘information page’ to the ‘donation page’. Similarly as on the information page the 
reference amount is mentioned at the same place on the donation page, with similar framing (see 
appendix A). On the ‘the donation’ page the donor specifies the amount they want to donate and if 
they want to receive a reward (if they donate an amount high enough to receive a reward). The 
participant is then guided towards the ‘payment page’, from this point on no reference amount was 
mentioned, where they again specify the donation amount. Here they also indicate if they want to 
publish their donation using social media and/or leave a (pseudo)name. In the next step they leave 







Figure 3. An example of the 'information page' as presented in the ‘reference’ condition. The numbers symbolize the 
different kinds of information as specified in the text above. The reference amount is presented in a yellow block, which is 
the main color of the platform, with the following sentence: “Did you know that on average donors on Voordekunst donate 
82 euros?”   
 
4.3 Participants  
The experiment was conducted among 23,676 unique visitors of the Voordekunst platform. 1702 
visitors donated, 890 donors in the control group (7.4%) and 812 in the suggestion condition (6.9%). 
All donors are included in the analyses, so both renewing (N = 221) and new donors (N = 1481). 
Renewing donors are those who made multiple donations during our experiment, while new 
donors made one donation. All participants made a donation to one of the projects advertised on 








We expected that the amount donated was higher in the social information treatment (N = 812) 
than in the control group (N = 890), but as can be seen in table 1 and figure 4 the data did not 




Table 1. Amount donated and conversion per condition among all donors  
 
 Base Suggest Test statistics Significance 
Median amount donated  €35.00 €38.37 X2=377.04  p=.120 
Mean amount donated €100.00 (SD=376.28) €106.09 (SD=281.69)   
Natural log of amount donated  1.62 1.66    
Minimum donation  €10.00 €10.00   
 
Maximum donation  €7,500.00 €5,000.00   
 
Modal donation  €25.00 €25.00    
Conversion  7.4% 6.9%   
Total donation amount  €89,005.05 €86,148.70 X2= 1701.00  p<.001 
  
Even though the amount donated was 6% (€6.09) higher in de social information treatment, a 
Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrated that this difference was not significant from the control group. 
The conversion (i.e., the likelihood of making a donation once the visitor has arrived at the payment 
page) was slightly higher in the control treatment, however the difference was minimal. Contrary to 
our expectations, the total amount collected was higher in the control group than the social 





 Note, this paper is work in progress. We are aware that our data is nested within projects and includes repeated measures. 
However, at the moment of writing this version, we have collected all the data, but net yet reived the complete data file. As a 






Figure 4. Graphical representation of the average and median amount donated per condition. 
 
In additional analyses we examined outliers in several ways. First, we excluded 12 
donations above €1,000 (X
2
 (1= 1,690) = 371.73, p = .121), which was around three standard 
deviations above the mean. We also applied a Winsorizing technique, treating 12 donations above 
€1,000 as €1,000. As can be seen in figure 5, this analysis revealed that the average individual 
donation amount in the social information treatment (N=812, M= 95.13, SD = 176.95) was 20% 
higher than the control group (N=890, M= 79.50, SD = 143.60). This difference was not significant 
(X
2




































The modal donation (€25.00) was similar in both conditions: in the social information treatment 
15.1% of all donors donated the modal amount versus 17.2% of all donors in the control group. 
However, donation amounts around 80 were slightly more popular in the social information 
treatment than the control group. For example, in the control group amounts between €75 and €85 
were donated by 3.7%, while this was slight higher in the social information treatment: 4.8%. One 
individual in the social information treatment actually donated the exact suggestion amount (€82).   
 
Figure 6. Distribution of the amount donated of all donors in categories per condition  
 
The reference amount was not per se more popular in the social information treatment at 
the expense of lower amounts. However, the modal condition (€25) and amounts below the modal 
condition (€10, €15, €20, €25)  were more popular in the control group. While amounts above (€ 
30, €35, €40 and €45)  the modal donation were more popular in the social information treatment. 
Even though €100 was a more popular donation amount in the suggest (8.7%) than the control 
group (7.5%), amounts above €100 were similar in both conditions.   






reported in table 2. The amount donated was 4.0% (€3.18) higher in de social information 
treatment (N = 713), but a Kruskal-Wallis test demonstrated that it was not significantly different 
from the control group (N = 768). The conversion was slightly higher in the social information 
treatment, however the difference was minimal. Also, contrary to the expectations the total 
amount collected was lower in the suggestion condition than the control group.  We also expected 
that the reference amount (€82) would be less popular in the control group than the social 
information treatment. However, as can be seen in the figure below,  this was not the case.  
The modal donation (€25.00) was similar in both conditions: in the social information 
treatment 15.7% of all donors donated the modal amount versus 18.1% of all donors in the control 
group. However, donation amounts around 80 were slightly more popular in the social information 
treatment than the control group. For example, in the control group amounts between €75 and €85 
were donated by 3.24%, while this was slight higher in the social information treatment: 5.2%.   
 
Table 2. Amount donated and conversion per condition among donors who made only one donation  
 
  Base Suggest Test statistics  Significance 
Median amount donated  €31.50 €35.00 X2=281.24  p=.363 
Mean amount donated €78.09 (SD=219.83) €81.27 (SD=184.77)   
Natural log of amount donated  1.60 1.61    
Minimum donation  €10.00 €10.00   
 
Maximum donation  €3,750.00 €3,000.00   
 
Modal donation  €25.00 €25.00    
Total donation amount  €59,970.45 €57,945.00 X2= 1,480.00  p<.001 
 
 The reference amount was not per se more popular in the social information treatment to 
the determinant of lower amounts (see the distribution of the exact amounts donated in  
Appendix B). However, the modal condition (€25) and amounts below the modal condition  
(€15, €20)  were more popular in the control group. While amounts above (€ 30, €35, €40 and €45)  the 
modal donation were more popular in the social information treatment. Even though €100 was a more 
popular donation amount in the suggest (8.7%) than the control group (6.8%), amounts above €100 were 













Figure 7. Distribution of the amount donated of the ‘new donors’ in categories per condition  
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Appendix C.  
C.1. Preregistration of the experiment  
 
JOINING THE CROWD (#1186) 
Author(s) 
René Bekkers (VU University) - r.bekkers@vu.nl 
Peggy Sue Claire van Teunenbroek (VU University) - p.s.c.van.teunenbroek@vu.nl 1) What's the main question being 
asked or hypothesis being tested in this study? 
Created: 09/14/2016 12:00 PM (PT) 
Public:    09/15/2016 03:03 PM (PT) 
 
 
Research question: What is the influence of social information on donation behavior on an online crowdfunding platform? Our key 
hypothesis is that social information increases the amount donated. 
 
2) Describe the key dependent variable(s) specifying how they will be measured. 
We measure two dependent variables: 
1) whether or not a visitor of the platform makes a donation; 
2) individual donation amount: the total amount donated to a project per donor;3) the natural logarithm of the individual 
donation amount. 
3) How many and which conditions will participants be assigned to? 
This is a straightforward A/B test with two conditions in a natural field experiment:  
(1) control condition: without adding social information 
(2) treatment condition: adding social information using the following sentence: "Wist je dat de gemiddelde gift op Voordekunst €82 
is?" ["Did you know that the average donation amount at voordekunst is €82?"]. We will present this information on the project 
information page as well as on the donation page. 
4) Specify exactly which analyses you will conduct to examine the main question/hypothesis. 
Straightforward comparisons of means without covariants will be conducted in the analysis of amounts donated as well as non-
parametric tests when donation amounts are not distributed normally. Amounts donated will also be analyzed in OLS, tobit and 
quantile regression models, including fixed effects at the project, time and individual level. Empty models will be run to estimate 
variance components at these levels. 
Conversion will be modeled in logistic regression models. Zero-inflated (negative binomial) models will be estimated in robustness 
checks. 






In addition, we test how the social information effect varies during the period a project is advertised. We expect that social information 
is less effective in the beginning as well as towards the end of the campaign, and most effective in the middle period. 
Finally, we examine how the social information effect varies with the concurrent average donation amount, testing two hypotheses. 
The social norm hypothesis predicts that when the amount displayed in the social information condition is larger than the intended 
donation amount, the amount donated increases, and when the amount displayed is lower the amount donated decreases. 
The reactance hypothesis predicts that the larger the difference between the amount displayed in the social information condition and 
the amount donors intended to give, the smaller the effect of the amount displayed. 
When individual donor data become available previous donation behavior and amounts will be examined in exploratory analyses as 
potential moderators of the social information effect. 
6) How many observations will be collected or what will determine sample size? No need to justify decision, but be precise 
about exactly how thenumber will be determined. 
Based on an effect size of .15 (based on previous research), we aim to achieve a sample of 900 donors. With a conversion rate of 5.27% 
we will need around 45,000 donors to achieve this sample size, which we estimate will take about 4 weeks. 
7) Anything else you would like to pre-register? (e.g., data exclusions, variables collected for exploratory purposes, unusual 
analyses planned?) The design is developed into a concept and uploaded by an external company: Digital Natives 
8) Have any data been collected for this study already? 
No, no data have been collected for this study yet 
Available at http://aspredicted.org/u5w9u.pdf  
Version of AsPredicted Questions: 1.05 
(Permanently archived at http://web.archive.org/web/*/http://aspredicted.org/u5w9u.pdf) 
 
 
 
